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Introduction
Development, poverty and the means to assist countries to break away from the causes of 
poverty have become some of the most important subjects in the international trade arena. 
Of  these  causes,  the  technological  gap  between  developed  and  developing  nations 
presents  a  compelling  call  for  some sort  of  action in  order  to  alleviate  the resource 
inequality.   
There are many examples that could illustrate that developing countries are being affected 
in some ways by the technological gap. Of these examples, one of the most important is 
the  apparent  struggle  between  large  multinational  pharmaceutical  companies  and 
developing nations with regards to access to medicines. This is because the question of 
health is one of the most important and contentious and evident indicators of poverty. 
This article does not pretend to be an exhaustive study of the issue of access to medicines, 
but some of the broader questions will be discussed in order to provide some evidence 
that strong international protection of technology may be affecting developing countries. 
Health technology is the most critical technology sought by the developing world. When 
one takes a look at some of the worrying health figures in poor countries, one of the most 
striking facts is that many of the health problems faced by the inhabitants of these is that 
they are preventable, and can be addressed with some of the existing health technology 
enjoyed by the West. The problem then has to be one of resources and distribution, as 
multinational corporations own a large share of this technology. This article will deal 
mostly with the issue of access to medicines, but this is by no means the only concern 
when talking about the access of less developed countries to health technology. 
1. The price of health 
Amongst the many technological advances in health, pharmaceuticals are more likely to 
be  owned  than  any  other.  Pharmaceuticals  are  essential  for  modern  medicine,  from 
antibiotics to vitamins, from vaccines to anti-retroviral treatments; one cannot imagine a 
healthy nation without proper access to the many treatments provided by pharmaceuticals. 
As Chetley points out, “Modern drugs, used well, can help the less developed countries to  
speed  improvements  in  health,  but  they  cannot  replace  a  lack  of  the  necessary  
infrastructure to sustain better health.”1 This means that pharmaceuticals are not the only 
issue at stake when dealing with health, but it is one very important factor. In fact, every 
day 30,000 people die of preventable infectious diseases, bringing the total of those who 
die for those reasons to eleven million people per year.2 Arguably, these are people who 
have a much greater chance of survival if they had access to the existing medicines that 
could potentially cure those diseases. Oxfam notes that:
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In sub-Saharan Africa today average life expectancy is 50 years--some 28  
years less than the average for people in high-income countries. Treatable  
infectious diseases in the region account for 60% of deaths, while cancer  
and cardiovascular disease--the leading causes of illness-related death in  
the U.S.--account for only 15%.3
One of the reasons why these populations do not have access to the medicines that could 
save  lives  is  because  the  price  of  health  is  high,  as  many medicines  are  owned  by 
pharmaceutical corporations that either sell their products at high prices, or request that 
the developing countries purchase licences to produce or import those medicines. The 
result of this system is an obvious discrepancy between the prices of the medicines and 
the possibility of those who need them to acquire these required medicaments.  
1.1 The pharmaceutical industry
The international manufacture of pharmaceuticals is largely in the hands of a number of 
multinational  corporations that control large parts of the health market.  As any other 
industry  based  in  the  capitalist  system,  the  multinational  pharmaceutical  companies 
operate on a system that attempts to maximise profits and shareholder value. If that is the 
goal  for these companies,  they are  certainly doing a  much better  job than any other 
industry in achieving those goals, as the profits and money involved in the pharmaceutical 
industry are staggering. In the year 2000, the pharmaceutical industry made $20.3 billion 
USD in profits globally, with a percentage of profits against sales of 18.6%, higher than 
any  other  industry  studied,  including  the  automotive,  entertainment  and 
telecommunications industries.4 Globally, there are ten pharmaceutical companies in the 
Global Fortune 500 list, which have sales that total more than $131 billion USD between 
them.5 This data does not even consider global giant Bayer, as they are diversifying in 
other fields and not only pharmaceuticals. In total, it is believed that the pharmaceutical 
industry will have worldwide revenue of $406 billion USD in 2002.6 Of this total, North 
America accounts for 41.8% of the total pharmaceutical market, with 24% from Europe 
and 11.3% from Japan alone. In contrast, China and South East Asia account for only 5% 
of  the  total  market,  the  Indian sub-continent  1.8% and Africa has  only  1.3% of  the 
market.7 This means that the pharmaceutical companies are staying away from some of 
the largest sections of the world’s population. 
The reason for this disparity is that pharmaceutical development is concentrated in some 
very few countries, mostly because to be successful in this industry there is a need to have 
considerable amounts of expenditure in research and development of new medicines. This 
is because the industry is highly competitive, and to remain competitive heavy spending is 
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2
required to obtain new curative chemical compounds.8 Unfortunately, only few countries 
in the world have the resources to invest in the required levels of research needed to 
compete  in  this  market.  The  United  Nations  Industrial  Development  Organisation 
(UNIDO),  commissioned  a  report  that  classifies  countries  according  to  their 
pharmaceutical development capacity.9 Of these, only ten countries were considered to be 
able to produce a sophisticated output, and provide enough research to stay ahead. It is 
needless  to  say  that  these  countries  are  considered  developed.  In  contrast,  only  five 
developing countries were found to be capable of producing pharmaceuticals through 
imitation and reverse engineering – these countries are Argentina, China, India, Korea 
and Mexico.10 Most other developing countries were able to produce limited versions or 
dosages  of  existing  pharmaceuticals,  but  were  unable  to  produce  any  innovative 
chemicals.  Most  worryingly,  59  LDCs  did  not  have  a  pharmaceutical  industry 
whatsoever. 
There are also some problems about the allocation of research in countries that have the 
capabilities to perform them. It is evident that under the present regime, there is a danger 
that research and development of drugs for illnesses affecting the developing world will 
continue to be under-funded, and that the money will be spent in high-return lifestyle 
drugs that are more profitable and sold almost exclusively in the developed countries, as 
is the case with drugs like Viagra, Zyban, Propecia, and Xenocal – evidence by the fact 
that 76% of all drugs approved in the US between 1989 and 2000 do not offer significant 
therapeutical benefits.11 It has been pointed out that the problem with the way in which 
research is directed, is that it explicitly responds to profits, and not to the lack of research 
in that particular area. In fact:
Lack of scientific knowledge is not the major barrier to drug development  
-  more  is  known  about  the  biology,  immunology,  and  genetics  of  
leishmania and trypanosomes than any other parasites. Nor does the gap  
lie with technology, which has greatly benefited from recent advances.  
Policy  issues  seem to  be  the  main  obstacle  to  the  translation  of  this  
knowledge into actual benefit for patients.12
The concentration of profits and research spending in some few developed nations have 
resulted in an industry that wields considerable economic power concentrated in one the 
mightiest economic industries on the planet. The industry’s economic power has been 
translated to political power, as the industry has been generous in spending in lobbying 
and advertising. It is believed that in the year 2000 and in the United States alone, the 
members of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) – the 
main pharmaceutical industry group – spent a total of $360 million US dollars in lobbying 
and policy advertising campaigns. The main lobbying recipients were the United States 
Congress  and  other  policy-making  governmental  organisations.13 But  perhaps  more 
worrying is the fact that the pharmaceutical industries has established very strong links 
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with  the  Bush  administration.  Industry  members  donated  $6.3  million  USD  to  the 
Republican  Party  during  the  last  elections,  with  the  giant  drugs  company  Glaxo-
Wellcome donating $1.2 million USD, while drug companies contributed $1.7 million 
USD to the inaugural party of the then newly elected President G. W. Bush.14 As a result 
of  this,  even  the  most  superficial  analysis  of  the  issue  of  drugs  and less  developed 
countries cannot help but notice how the interests of the United States and those of the 
pharmaceutical companies seem indistinguishable.
1.2 Pharmaceuticals and patents
From all of the intellectual property industries of the world, the pharmaceutical industry is 
the one that benefits the most benefits from the existence of the patent system, as they are 
awarded  with  a  limited  monopoly  in  the  products  discovered  during  research  in 
pharmaceuticals that allows them exclusive control of the exploitation, manufacture, and 
licensing of the work. One of the justifications for the existence of patents is to allow the 
inventor of a product to recuperate the economic investment incurred in the creation of 
that  product,  and  to  profit  from  its  exclusive  use.  Because  of  this  monopoly,  the 
pharmaceutical companies can charge whatever seems fit to recover said investment. Part 
of the profits then goes towards future research and development of new drugs. 
The reason for  this  particular  benefit  is  that  it  is  undeniable  that  the pharmaceutical 
industry is the field of innovation in which the justifications for intellectual property are 
more evident than in any other. Several studies have demonstrated time and time again 
that  without  patents  the  amount  of  innovations  in  pharmaceuticals  would  be  greatly 
reduced. For example, a study of British pharmaceutical industries concluded that patents 
were vital for pharmaceutical industries because expenditure in research and development 
of new drugs would be reduced by 64% if there were no patents.15 In another classical 
study, Mansfield concluded that 68% of new pharmaceutical innovations between 1981 
and 1983 would not have been developed without a patent system, far ahead than other 
industries.16   
Despite the undeniable importance of patents, the amount of money spent on research and 
development does not seem to match the profits earned by the pharmaceutical industry. 
Representatives from the industry calculate that the amount of money invested in research 
and development totals $30 billion USD globally per year, being only 7.3% of the total 
estimated income for 2002.17 What is more, the amount of money spent on research by the 
private sector does not really seem that impressive when compared to the amount spent by 
the public sector. As an example, in 1997 the pharmaceutical companies in the United 
States spent a total of $18.9 billion USD in research, while the leading public sector 
research institution, the National Institute of Health (NIH), spent $12.7 billion USD on 
that same year.18 
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Another  indication of the relative under-funding in  research and development  by the 
pharmaceutical  industry is  that  a  considerable  proportion of  the  research funding for 
pharmaceutical companies comes from the public sector. A study in the United States, 
examining drugs developed between 1991 and 1997, found 30 new drugs classified as 
offering significant gains in therapy. Half of these were found to have been developed 
with public financial involvement at some stage of their research, and of those 15 drugs, 
11 were financially funded through all of the stages of research.19 Furthermore, public 
funding is likely to be more critical where research is in areas of less certain commercial 
return. As Love and Nader state, “The federal government plays a particularly important  
role in the highest risk research projects, including basic research, where commercial  
payoffs are least certain.”20   
Despite these figures, the pharmaceutical industry claims that the research expenses are 
cumulative, arguing that it takes an average of 15 years to develop new medicines. It is 
estimated that any new drug will have cost the pharmaceutical companies anywhere from 
$10 million USD up to $500 million USD.21 However, a study by Tufts University and 
sponsored  by  PhRMA concluded that  each  new drug costs  an  average  $802 million 
USD.22 This  study has  been seriously criticised by consumer organisations and other 
health concern groups.23 In particular, a study by Love and the Consumer Project on 
Technology (CPT)  found that  this  figure is  completely at  odds  with the  information 
disclosed by pharmaceutical companies to the US tax authorities.24 Something else that 
appears  to  be  at  odds  with  the  research  and  development  figures  provided  by  the 
pharmaceutical industry is the fact that very few new chemical compounds are developed 
each year, in contrast with the considerable amount of pharmaceutical patents awarded. 
This is the concept of “ever-greening” already existing chemicals. Correa comments:
The  pharmaceutical  industry  significantly  exploits  incremental  
innovations through the development and patenting of a large number of  
improvements  or  minor  changes  on  existing  drugs,  often  in  order  to  
extend the effective term of protection for the original invention (”ever-
greening”).25
Dutfield  agrees  with  this  point,  and  further  comments  that  these  practices  establish 
“exclusion  zones”  that  provide  a  competitive  and  bargaining  advantage  for  patent 
owners.26 The  cumulative  nature  of  the  pharmaceutical  market,  coupled  with  other 
19  Love, J. and Nader, R. Federally Funded Pharmaceutical Inventions. Testimony before the Special Committee on the 
Aging of the United States Senate, February 24, 1993. @: <http://www.cptech.org/pharm/pryor.html>
20  Ibid.  
21  DiMasi, J. A. "Trends in Drug Development Costs, Times, Risks", Drug Information Journal, 29 (2), 1995, pp.375-
84.
22  Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development. Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development Pegs Cost of a 
New Prescription Medicine at $802 Million, November 30 2001. @: 
<http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=6>
23  For a comprehensive list of some criticisms, see: <http://rxpolicy.com/industry/802milliondollarquestion.htm> 
24  Love, J. “CPTech release on Tufts study and IRS data”, Ip-health List, November 30, 2001. @: 
<http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2001-November/002481.html>
25  Correa, C. “Internationalization of the Patent System and New Technologies”, Conference on the International 
Patent System, Geneva, Switzerland March 25 - 27, 2002. @: 
<http://www.wipo.int/patent/agenda/en/meetings/2002/presentations/correa.pdf>
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Ashgate, 2003, pp.109-110. 
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restrictive competitive practices, such as the existence of drug cartels,27 serve to further 
undermine the argument that asserts the industry’s pricing schemes and profits. 
Another reason given by the pharmaceutical companies to support the pricing scheme is 
the Schumpeterian hypothesis,  which roughly states that  market  power held by large 
corporations serves to stimulate innovations because the corporation is more capable of 
spending more on research and development. Indeed, R&D spending seems to rise more 
or less proportionally with a company’s size after a certain level has been passed, but as 
Symeonidis points out, “there seems to be little empirical support for the view that large  
firm size  or high concentration are  factors generally  conducive  to  a  higher  level  of  
innovative activity.”28 The figures presented earlier regarding the research spending by the 
pharmaceutical companies would seem to corroborate this observation.29
Taking this into consideration, it is difficult to establish the reasons why the prices of 
pharmaceuticals  remain as  high  as  to  maintain the substantial  profits  that  have been 
described.  Some argue  that  there  is  evidence  that  the pharmaceutical  market  is  very 
similar to a monopolistic one because of the protection awarded by patents. Lall points 
out that “the pricing policies of the large drug firms are based on purely monopolistic  
principles  (…)  rather  than  on  the  socially  responsible  one  of  lowering  them  after  
recovering research costs.”30 The common denominator seems to be the holding of a 
patent. Several studies cited by Reekie and Weber demonstrate that while a company 
holds a patent, the prices remain considerably high, and usually do not change whatsoever 
during the lifetime of the right. Prices only fall once the product is no longer under patent 
protection  and  can  be  manufactured  by  anybody  else.31 This  is  the  reason  why  the 
production of generic medicines – medicines that are not protected by patents – is a much 
more competitive and cheaper market. Grabowski points out that:
…the development costs of generic compounds are relatively modest. In  
the United States, and most other countries, generic compounds must only  
show  that  they  are  bio-equivalent  to  the  pioneering  brand  to  receive 
market registration. This process only takes a few years and costs one to  
two million dollars.32 
If generic medicines are cheaper to produce and result in a more competitive market, one 
should  expect  to  see  more  generic  production  of  pharmaceuticals  after  patents  have 
expired.  Unfortunately,  this  does  not  appear  to  be  the  case,  as  it  would  appear  that 
generics  are  treated  in  many  markets  as  separate  products  that  require  bureaucratic 
approval, making their implementation in a market much more difficult.33 Others claim 
27  Ibid. 
28  Symeonidis, G. Innovation firm size and market structure: Schumpeterian hypotheses and some new themes. OECD 
Economics Department Working Paper No. 161, 1996. @: 
<http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1996doc.nsf/LinkTo/OCDE-GD(96)58>
29  For a comprehensive study of the pharmaceutical industry in the United States, see: Public Citizen’s Congress Watch. 
America's other Drug Problem: A briefing Book on the Rx Drug Debate, Washington DC: Public Citizen’s 
Publication Office, 2002. 
30  Lall, S. As cited by Reekie, W. D. and Weber, M. H. Profits, Politics and Drugs, London: MacMillan Press, 1979, 
p.94. 
31  Reekie, and Weber, op cit; p.94-101.  
32  Grabowski, H. “Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals”, Journal of International Economic Law, 
Vol.5, Issue 4, 2002, pp.849-860.
33  For more on this, see: Griliches, Z. and Cockburn, I. "Generics and New Goods in Pharmaceutical Price Indexes", 
American Economic Review, Vol.84, Issue 5, 1994, pp.1213-1232. 
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that pharmaceutical companies dedicated to the production of generic drugs are often in 
direct  competition  with  the  innovation  companies,  and  therefore  making  the  generic 
market a much less profitable one because the proprietary industry has an advantage by 
their  reliance  in  patented  materials.34 This  indicates  that  patenting  of  medicines  will 
continue because it is the most profitable development method.    
1.2 Pricing out of reach
The existing proprietary system of pharmaceutical development based on patents has the 
end result of the existence of a market ruled by profits, with the price of even life-saving 
drugs determined by market forces. This has serious effects in the developing world. This 
situation means that drug prices remain too high for the most impoverished nations of the 
world. All around the developing world the evidence of the problem of drug pricing is 
evident. A report by Oxfam offers this example:
Two million children die every year from pneumonia, almost all of them in  
developing  countries.  US-based  Pfizer's  best-selling  antibiotic,  
azithromycin  (Zithromax),  is  particularly  good  for  treating  child  
pneumonia.  It  is under patent in Kenya, where it costs as much as in  
Norway.  But  Kenya  only  spends  US$17  per  head  every  year  on  
healthcare, while Norway spends US$2300.35
Drugs that are basic for the health in the developing world are at the moment unattainable. 
A study sponsored by the charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has found that several 
drugs required to treat common illnesses in the poorer countries are priced out of reach of 
the developing world. An example offered states that: 
A  recent  study  of  bacterial  meningitis  caused  by  Streptococcus  
pneumoniae in children aged 2 months to 3 years demonstrated that use of  
ceftriaxone sodium could reduce mortality from 66% to 32% compared  
with treatment with chloramphenicol in oily suspension. Both antibiotics  
have  a  sustained  action  and  require  very  simple  protocols  (daily  
intramuscular injection for a short time) and therefore are equally easy to  
use  in  adverse  conditions.  However,  ceftriaxone treatment  is  10 times  
more expensive than chloramphenicol.36 
This is important because acute respiratory infections kill almost 4 million people per year 
in the developing world, and as it has shown, ceftriaxone sodium is too expensive. The 
same situation can be found with diarrhoeal diseases, which kill 2.5 million people per 
year.  A bacterial  disease that  has led to several  outbreaks in developing countries is 
shigella dyseneriae, which has a mortality rate of 15% if left untreated. The strain of 
bacteria  responsible  has  developed resistance to  most  antibiotics.  The  only  ones  that 
remain effective are fluoroquinolones such as ciprofloaxin and niprofloaxin, but these 
cost $25 USD per dosage, instead of the $2 USD for other regular antibiotics.37  
34  US Congressional Budget Office. How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns 
in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998.
35  Oxfam. Priced out of Reach: How WTO patent policies will reduce access to medicines in the developing world. @: 
<http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/priced/priced.html>
36  Chirac, P; Pécoul, B. et al. “Access to essential medicines in poor countries: a lost battle?” JAMA, Vol.281, No. 4, 
1999, p.362.  
37  Ibid; p.363. 
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There  also  appears  to  be  a  severe  drug  pricing  discrepancy  between  developed  and 
developing countries.  For example,  Balasubramaniam points  out that  retail  prices are 
often considerably higher in developing countries than in developed ones, with some 
countries  experiencing  prices  that  are  four  times  higher  than  the  recommended 
manufacturer price.38 The reason for this seems to be an attempt by the pharmaceutical 
industry to maximise profits in economies that do not purchase their products in the same 
volume than developed nations.  A spokesman of  the British  pharmaceutical  industry 
expressed this by saying that “…the reason multinational companies try to grab back as  
much profit as possible out of the less developed countries is frankly because they are  
suspicious of the future stability of their operations there.”39    
The  most  worrying  case  of  pricing  medicines  beyond  reach,  and  perhaps  the  most 
publicised in the last years, is the case of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS), caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). By December 2001, an 
estimated 40 million people around the world carried HIV or have developed AIDS; 95% 
of those are in developing countries, and 30 million have died from the disease. Of those 
totals,  28.1  million  people  had  been  infected  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  alone,  with  an 
estimate of 3.4 million added each year.40 According to a joint study published by the 
WHO, UNICEF, UNAIDs and MSF, the high cost of HIV drugs is prohibitive for most of 
the countries in the developing world. The study has identified several reasons for the 
high cost of these medicines. According to the study, these are:
— Patents
— Limited volume
— Limited price competition
— High import duties, tariffs, and local taxes
— High mark-ups for wholesaling, distribution, and dispensing
— Individual country pricing strategies—for example, price fixing by the 
government,  policies  of  price  freedom  for  new  products  or  even  
agreements with industry on profit control.41
According to the study, the price of a full treatment per person per year can range from 
$10,000 to $15,000 USD with medicines purchased in the developed world, depending on 
what type of treatment is taken.42 This is certainly beyond the budget of the countries that 
have been affected the most by the epidemic. The average per capita annual income for 
Africa is only $510 USD, and in some affected countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria 
and Madagascar, more than 65% of the population lives with less than $1 USD a day.43 
Another report by the Washington Post calculates that, at current market drug prices, the 
cost of treating the entire population living with HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe – one of the 
38  Balasubramaniam, K “Access to Medicines: Patents, Prices and Public Policy – Consumer Perspectives”, Global  
Intellectual Property Rights, Drahos and Mayne, op cit, pp.90-107. 
39  Teeling-Smith, G. As cited by Melrose, D. Bitter Pills: Medicines and the Third World Poor, Oxford: Oxfam Print 
Unit, 1982, p.27. 
40  More information and statistics on the epidemic can be found at the United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS) website at: <http://www.unaids.org/epidemic_update/report_dec01/>
41  UNICEF. Sources and prices of selected drugs and diagnostics for people living with HIV/AIDS. UNICEF, UNAIDS 
Secretariat, WHO and MSF Project, May 2002, p.1. 
42  Chirac; Pécoul, Op cit. 
43  UNDP. Population below income poverty line, 1983-99, 2001.
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most affected countries – would be $18 billion USD, 265% of the Gross National Product 
(GNP) for that  country.  In contrast,  the cost  of treating all  of  the people infected in 
Switzerland is only $144 million USD, as the infected population is only 12,000 people, 
representing only 0.06% of the country’s GNP.44 
Geographical  variations  in  prices  of  the  same  drug  are  also  interesting  to  compare. 
GlaxoSmithKline's Retrovir costs £125 British Pounds (GBP) in the UK, but the same 
drug costs  as  little  as £54 GBP if  imported from other  European countries.  Another 
example is that “in Brazil, the drug Fluconazole is available for US$1, whereas in South  
Africa it costs US$20. A 1998 study by the Consumer Project on Technology found prices  
for GlaxoSmithKline's version of Amoxil was $8 in Pakistan, but was $36 in Malaysia.”45
Another problem faced by the developing countries is that some drugs developed for 
combating tropical diseases are not being produced any more because they are no longer 
profitable. Some of these drugs were developed decades ago and are no longer subject to 
patents; however, they are not in use in the developed countries where those diseases are 
rare.46 The problem is made more acute not only by the pricing scheme and lack of 
availability, but by the marked lack of research and development of drugs for diseases 
that affect the developing world. For example, a report in 1996 by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) says that “of the $56 billion spent on health-related research and 
development worldwide, only 0.2 percent is spent on pneumonia, diarrhoeal diseases and  
tuberculosis - which together represent 18 percent of the global disease burden.”47
Even countries with adequate levels of development can be hit suddenly when there is a 
disadvantageous  economic  shift.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  recent  economic  crisis  in 
Argentina,  which has  been suffering one of  the worse recessions  in  its  history,  with 
runaway inflation and a disastrous devaluation of the national currency. One of the many 
problems that have arisen for the Argentinean society is that  suddenly people cannot 
afford medicines. This is illustrated by the fact that since the start of the crisis no insulin 
was  available  anywhere  in  the  country,  as  the  pharmacies,  the  government,  and 
distributors could not  afford to  import  it  from abroad.  The problem is  that  diabetics 
usually  buy  insulin  supplies  for  about  120  days,  but  because  of  the  devaluation, 
pharmacies are not accepting pre-orders, or giving credit. Any person who is ill has to be 
able to pay $150 USD upfront, as the chemists are not accepting the national currency. 
This has reached such alarming stages that the Argentinean government had to declare a 
state of emergency and ask for insulin donations from abroad. The crisis is deepened by 
the fact that a total  of 30% of the pharmacies in Argentina have had to close down. 
Hospitals are even finding it difficult to obtain even the most basic supplies, such as 
antibiotics, vaccines, gauze and needles.48 
2. Escaping the ownership stranglehold 
Seeing how medicine prices affect health statistics, it should come as no surprise that 
many developing countries have been trying to get around the status quo and challenging 
44  Hirshcel, B. “The cost gap of fighting AIDS”, The Washington Post Online, 2000. @: 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A58513-
2000Dec28&notFound=true>  
45  AVERT. HIV and AIDS drugs in Africa, 2001. @: <http://www.avert.org/aidsdrugsafrica.htm>
46  Chirac; Pécoul, et al. Op cit.
47  Deraj, R. “India caught in patent trap”, Asia Times Online, October 25, 2001. @: <http://www.atimes.com/ind-
pak/CJ25Df01.html>
48  Cañas, M. “Argentina se queda sin suministros médicos”, Boletín Fármacos, Volumen 5, número 1, enero 2002. @: 
<http://www.boletinfarmacos.org/012002/noticias.htm>
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the  international  patent  stranglehold  in  different  ways,  particularly  by  attempting  to 
generate their own national pharmaceutical industries. Needless to say, the countries that 
have managed to achieve this are generally large developing countries, or countries with 
somewhat sophisticated R&D capabilities that enable them to imitate chemicals created in 
industrialised  nations.  The  efforts  of  three  developing  countries  to  generate  local 
pharmaceutical capabilities will be analysed next.  
2.1. Costa Rica
Costa Rica is one of the first developing countries to adopt a social health policy, which 
included a program to provide affordable medicines to the poorest sectors of this Central 
American country. As a matter of fact, the country has been put forward as an example 
for a workable drugs policy that can have positive effects on health. As stated by Chetley: 
“Can the products of the pharmaceutical industry help to improve health? Some of them 
can, as Costa Rica has shown through the judicious use of vaccines and a handful of  
other carefully selected medicines.”49 
It was back in 1941 that the Costa Rican Congress approved legislation to create the Caja 
Costarricense  del  Seguro  Social (CCSS),  an  autonomous  government  institution 
dedicated to manage the public healthcare system in Costa Rica. One of the first actions 
of the health system was to establish a public pharmacy in one of the main hospitals 
where patients would be able to obtain cheap medicines provided by the State.50 The 
system of providing cheap or sponsored medicines continues to this day throughout the 
country, with several basic types of preventive medicine being awarded for free.51 
Costa Rica has managed to ensure that the larger areas of the population have access to 
required medicines by following a double strategy. The first aspect of this strategy is to 
provide access to generic drugs either produced in the country or imported. These generic 
drugs  are  cheaper  as  they  are  produced  without  ties  to  patent  licensing,  which,  as 
discussed, have the usual effect of making drugs more expensive. The second aspect is the 
importation of patented medications, but selling them at cheaper prices by providing a 
State funded subvention.52 
Access to generic drugs was not a problem with the existing patent legislations of the 
country, as it was deemed that there was an overriding necessity to provide access to basic 
medicaments  to  even  the  poorest  sectors  of  the  country.  In  particular,  the  patent 
legislation  allows  for  two  legal  mechanisms  that  permit  the  State  to  use  generic 
medication. One is by granting compulsory licensing (licencia obligatoria), which will 
take place when the patent owner has not made use of or licensed his invention. Any 
individual or company can then request that the State recognises a compulsory patent if it 
fulfils certain procedural requirements.53 There is also an option for granting patents for 
public use, which means that the government can grant, by executive decree, a public 
licence for the exploitation of a patent by the State or any other parties specifically named 
in cases of public interest, emergency or national security. This would certainly include 
49  Chetley, Op cit. 
50  Miranda, G. La Transición de la Nutrición y la Salud de Costa Rica Democrática, Boston: International Foundation 
for Developing Countries (INFDC), 1996. 
51  Miranda, Op cit.
52  United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development. Aspectos sociales del desarrollo sostenible en Costa Rica.  
April 1997. @: <http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/costaric/social.htm#health>  
53  Ley No. 6867 de Patentes de invención, dibujos y modelos industriales y modelos de utilidad. Costa Rica, Art. 18. 
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the  patenting  of  medicines  in  case  of  public  need.  However,  the  State  will  grant 
compensation to the patent owner in case it decides to follow this procedure. 54 
The existing regime has had a tremendous impact in the capabilities of the Costa Rican 
social health service to provide low sot medicines to the population. It is calculated that 
by  2002,  the  CCSS  spent  $67  million  USD  in  medicines  from  approximately  100 
suppliers,  and  this  figure  makes  up  80%  of  the  entire  Costa  Rican  pharmaceutical 
market.55 It is calculated that this expenditure is particularly strong in generic drugs. The 
CCSS  spends  33%  of  its  budget  to  purchase  medicines  in  patented  or  branded 
pharmaceuticals,  while  the  remaining  67% goes  to  purchase  generic  medicines  from 
generic suppliers.56 The Costa Rican generic industry has been growing considerably, 
enhancing their imitation capabilities thanks to the acquiring power of the social health 
service.  Of  the  four  largest  suppliers  to  the  CCSS,  three  are  the  national  generic 
companies Stein, Gutis and Raven, which provide 28.44% of the medicines purchased by 
the health service.57 In total, the CCSS provides a total of 45 million doses of medicines 
per year.58  
The importance of generic drugs for the Costa Rican health service cannot be denied. For 
example, the price of the patented version of paclitaxel, a chemical used in the treatment 
of AIDS is $160 USD per unit, while its generic equivalent costs $25 USD, which has 
allowed decreasing the annual cost per person from $6,800 USD to $1,300 USD.59 
The mentioned provisions have made a remarkable difference in public health figures in 
Costa Rica. In 1940 the child mortality rate in the country was 123 per thousand births. In 
1950, just nine years after the implementation of a social health system, this figure had 
come down to 90/1000. The figures continued to decrease steadily, until in 1970 the 
figure  was  61/1000,  and  in  1980  it  had  decreased  to  levels  comparable  to  those  of 
developed countries at 19/1000.60 Infant mortality under five in 2001 was 9/1000. Similar 
success can be seen in the life expectancy figures. In 1940, the life expectancy in the 
country was of 46.9 years. In 1950 the figure rose to 55.6 years, in 1970 it was 65.4, and 
in 2003 it is 77.9 years.61 
It is difficult to measure the extent to which these figures can be attributed directly to the 
Costa Rican medicine policies, but there can be no doubt that wide access to some vital 
medicines  –  in  particular  antibiotics  and vaccines  –  has  played an  important  part  in 
achieving  these  impressive  advances  in  public  health  statistics.  Nevertheless,  it  is 
important to point out that the Costa Rican improvement in these basic health figures is 
far  better  than  the  increases  in  the  same  data  experienced  on  average  around  the 
developing world. In 1970, the average child mortality rate in the less developed countries 
was of 109/1000, and in 1999 it had been reduced to 59/1000. Life expectancy was 55 
years in average, and in 1999 it had risen to 64 years.62 
54  Ley No. 6867, Art. 20
55  Avalós, A. “Guerra por calidad de medicinas genéricas”, La Nación, November 11, 2002. 
56  “Oposición médica defiende genéricos”, El Nuevo Día (Puerto Rico), February 11, 2004.  
57  Bermúdez Mora, K. “Medicamentos: Jaqueca del Cafta”, El Financiero, May 2, 2004. 
58  Avalós, A. “País defiende acceso a medicinas genéricas”, La Nación, October 10, 2003. 
59  “Oposición médica defiende genéricos”, op cit. 
60  Ministerio de la Presidencia de Costa Rica. Indicators and democratic governance: Measuring Sustainable Human 
Development in Costa Rica, 1998. @: <http://www.estadonacion.or.cr/nacion2/indi-t2.htm> 
61  Ibid.  
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2.2 India
The case of India is very interesting for two reasons; India is one of the most populous 
countries in the world, and large sectors of its population live under exceptionally poor 
conditions. For the year 2003, India was ranked 127th in the Human Development Index, 
an appalling showing for a country with such high potential development.63 Nevertheless, 
India has experienced some improvement in some basic statistics. For example, in 1973 
more than half of the Indian population lived below the poverty line, which amounted to 
54.9% of the total population. In 1999 the same figure had been reduced to 26.1%, a 
considerable improvement.64
Before 1970, the state of the drug policy in India mirrored that of most of the developing 
world,  with  considerable  reliance  on  the  importation  of  medicines  from  developed 
countries. In fact, India produced locally only 25% of the total medicines consumed in the 
country.65 It was in that year that India passed a new Patents Act. It has been argued that 
this Act has:
…greatly weakened intellectual property protection in India, particularly  
for pharmaceutical innovations. Pharmaceutical product innovations, as  
well as those for food and agrochemicals, became unpatentable, allowing  
innovations patented elsewhere to be freely copied and marketed in India.  
The  statutory  term was  shortened  to  5  to  7  years  on  pharmaceutical  
process patents and automatic licensing was put in place.66  
This legislation, disallowing the existence of product patents, had two different effects on 
the Indian pharmaceutical market. Firstly, local generic production of pharmaceuticals 
increased considerably; and secondly, foreign pharmaceutical companies decreased the 
amount of patents they had as they deemed that it was not worthwhile to manufacture 
under the existing legal conditions in the country. By 1991, Indian companies produced 
70% of  the  drugs  available  in  the  national  market.67 The  drug  policy  in  India  also 
emphasised some price control policies, with at least 74 different medicines protected by 
government pricing restrictions. The justification for this policy is to ensure wider access 
to and availability of essential drugs within the country.68 
These policies so far have been very successful in keeping prices down when compared to 
other countries. For example, the antacid drug ranitinide can be found in the West as the 
patented drug Zantac, but in India it is produced generically. The drug is 26 times more 
expensive in the UK than in India, and 56 times more expensive in the United States. The 
antibiotic ciprofloxacin is also produced generically in India, and it is up to 15 times 
cheaper than in the UK and the United States.69 Another important achievement of the 
62  World Bank. Poverty Trends and Voices of the Poor: Social Indicators - Health: life expectancy, infant and 
maternalmortality, malnutrition.@: <http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/data/trends/mort.htm>
63  UNDP. Human Development Index 2003, Op cit. 
64  Bhalla, S. FAQs on poverty in India. Seminar at the Delhi School of Economics, July 20, 2000. @: 
<http://www.oxusresearch.com/downloads/Ei200700.pdf>
65  Lanjouw, J. O. "The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and 
Suffering?" Electronic Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, Oxford IP Research Centre, WP 07/99, 
<http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0799.html>
66  Ibid.  
67  Ibid.
68  Ibid.
69  Ibid. 
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Indian drugs policy is its potential for exporting cheap drugs to developing countries. For 
example:
Cipla,  an  Indian  generic  drug  manufacturer,  offered  to  supply  triple-
combination  therapy  for  HIV/AIDS  for  $350  per  patient  per  year  to  
Medicins San Frontieres. It also offered to sell the therapy for $600 per 
patient per year to poor governments, on the condition that the recipient  
governments provide the drugs for free to those with HIV/AIDS.70
Since  the  implementation  of  the  1970  Patent  Act,  various  health  indicators  have 
improved. In 1970 the child mortality rate was 137.2 deaths per thousand births, and in 
the year 2001 it had fallen to 67/1000. The average life expectancy in 1970 was 49.4 
years, and by the year 2001 it had increased to 63.3.71 This substantial improvement in 
health statistics cannot be attributed solely to the country’s pharmaceutical policy, and it 
is  impossible  to  measure  just  how effective  the  policy  has  been  in  providing  cheap 
medicines, but there cannot be any doubt that wider access to drugs has been one of the 
factors that have allowed India to improve these figures. In the end, as expressed by Mira 
Shiva, an expert on pharmaceutical drugs with the Voluntary Health Association of India 
(VHAI), “India's thriving drug industry has provided a good example of how drugs can 
be produced cheaply and profitably for local markets when unburdened by exorbitant  
licensing fees.”72    
Despite serious challenges by developed countries – in particular the United States – and 
multinational pharmaceutical companies, India had been set to continue providing cheap 
access to drugs to its population. The government has repeatedly stated that among its 
main goals in the area of medicine there has to be a serious emphasis in attempting to 
provide cheap access to drugs, and to encourage research and development of new drugs 
by Indian companies.73 However, the international pressure has finally produced some 
results and India is being forced to comply with international protection standards and to 
include  in  their  legislation  protection  to  product  patents.  Arguably,  this  is  going  to 
threaten the large generic market. Some reforms are on the way, but they are to be fewer 
than expected.74  
2.3 Brazil
Brazil  is  an oddity  as  far  as  developing countries  goes,  with a  large population and 
impressive natural resources, yet with serious distribution problems. Brazil’s economy is 
plagued by inequality, corruption, high inflation and devaluation. In the year 2001, Brazil 
was considered a medium development country by the UNDP, being placed 69th in the 
Human Development Index. 
Brazil was one of the original signatories of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Patents, and ratified the agreement in July 7, 1884. As such it has been part of 
the  international  patent  protection  system,  although  in  a  lax  manner.  The  modern 
Brazilian pharmaceutical policy dates back to the implementation of the 1971 Code of 
70  Consumer Project on Technology. Offers of Price Reductions for HIV/AIDS Drugs, 2001. @: 
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/pcuts.html> 
71  UNDP. Human Development Index 2003, op cit.
72  Deraj, Op cit. 
73  Indian Department of Science and Technology. Pharmaceutical Policy 2002. @: <http://www.techno-
preneur.net/timeis/cgovt/pharmapolicy.html> 
74  “India reforms drug patent laws”, BBC News, 15 May, 2002. @: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1988867.stm>
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Industrial  Property,  which  covered  everything  relating  to  patents.  Although  this 
legislation complied with most of the prior recommendations set by the Paris Agreement, 
it made two very important exceptions, as pharmaceuticals and food were not covered by 
either product or process patent system.75 This meant that the national pharmaceutical 
industry could produce cheap versions of patented drugs and make them available to the 
local market. 
Besides the specific exception to pharmaceuticals, the Brazilian legislation was able to 
provide several other provisions to safeguard the widest possible access to medicines to 
its  population  by  means  of  many  other  legal  mechanisms,  such  as  a  comprehensive 
system of compulsory licensing. The Brazilian legislation required a patent owner to work 
or effectively exploit a patent in the country; merely importing a patented product into 
Brazil  did  not  constitute  effective  exploitation  of  the  patent.  This  meant  that  any 
interested party could, with very little effort, claim that a patent was not being exploited, 
thus being granted a compulsory licence.76 The government could also grant compulsory 
licences in cases of public interest, but this would be a non-exclusive right and could be 
exploited by any other interested party, the rationale behind this being cases of national 
security or health.77 
A new patent legislation was passed in 1996, with the main change that it allowed for the 
patenting of pharmaceuticals, but retained the provisions on compulsory licensing due to 
disuse or for public interest.78 In those respects, Brazilian law does not differ much from 
the provisions that can be found in other developing countries, such as the mentioned 
cases of India and Costa Rica.   
Perhaps  one  of  the  most  interesting  features  of  the  Brazilian  legislation  is  that  it 
specifically  allows for  the  existence of  parallel  imports.  Article  68(3)  and (4)  of  the 
Brazilian patents legislation allows for the existence of parallel imports into the Brazilian 
market.  The  article  states  “In  case  of  importation,  in  order  to  exploit  a  patent  or  
importation in the preceding paragraph, third parties shall also be allowed to import a  
product manufactured according to a process patent or a product patent, provided it has  
been placed on the market directly by the patent owner or with his consent.”79 This means 
that if a pharmaceutical is made available in a market, then Brazil can import it from that 
market with no legal complications. 
To complement the compulsory licensing and parallel imports provisions in Brazil, there 
is legislation that specifically allows the country to produce its own generic version of 
patented drugs. The legal framework for this was initially set by executive decree number 
793 of  April  5  1993,  which  allows  for  generic  drugs  to  be  produced  by  authorised 
manufacturers in accordance with the compulsory licensing provisions described,  and 
established a system of registration for such pharmaceuticals. The system was later made 
into law in 1999.80 
With the legal framework in place, the Brazilian government started to encourage the 
production of several drugs in the country, with the main efforts being directed towards 
75  Shanker, D. “Brazil, the Pharmaceutical Industry and the WTO”, Journal of World Intellectual Property, Vol.5 No.1, 
January 2002, p.58. 
76  Law No. 5722, Code of Industrial Property 1970. Brazil, Arts. 33 and 49. 
77  Shanker, Op cit; p.58. 
78  Ibid; p.54. 
79  Law No. 5722, Code of Industrial Property 1970, Brazil, Art. 68(4).
80  Lei No. 9787, Medicamentos genéricos, 1999, Brazil.  
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producing medicines to treat HIV/AIDS, which poses a large health concern. Brazil has 
the largest population infected with HIV in Latin America, with an estimated 540,000 
people living with HIV/AIDS in 1999.81 Soon after, Brazilian pharmaceutical companies 
sponsored by the government were producing several anti-retrovirals and other medicines 
to decrease the effects of the disease, including very expensive patented drugs such as 
nevirapine, AZT and 3TC. With the use of these generic drugs, the price of a complete 
treatment  has  been  drastically  reduced  when  compared  to  countries  with  patented 
medicines, averaging $1.55 USD per day – as opposed to an average $40 USD a day in 
developed nations. Brazil also provides a cocktail of 12 different drugs for free to more 
than 100,000 people who cannot afford them.82 There are many indications that point 
towards the success of the Brazilian generic HIV drugs policy. The number of deaths 
caused by AIDS has been reduced by up to 50% since 1996, and 146,000 patients have 
avoided hospitalisation since 1997.83 
Just as with the other countries mentioned, the open pharmaceutical policy in Brazil has 
been  translated  in  gradual  increase  in  health  statistics.  In  1970  infant  mortality  was 
96/1000 births, and the life expectancy was of 59 years. In 2001 the infant mortality stood 
at 36.96/1000 births, and life expectancy had risen to 67 years.84 
3. The Empire strikes back
As shown in the previous section, some countries have started to take steps to provide 
large parts of their populations with basic medicines, but the pharmaceutical multinational 
companies did not take these efforts lightly. Making use of the impressive political and 
economic power that they possess, some of these companies started to act against some of 
the countries that they believed did not provide adequate protection for their patented 
products. 
The strategy of the pharmaceutical industry appears to be clear. The industry is using the 
political influence they have in the United States to try to get the American government to 
send a  message to  some developed nations by threatening them with trade sanctions 
through the aforementioned Special 301 status. 
An example of a country that is suffering such the threat of the trade sanctions India, 
which has been named as a Priority Foreign Country by the USTR in the last four years, 
mostly because of its generic pharmaceutical policies. PhRMA is setting its sights on 
India  by  continually  requesting  that  they  be  placed  on  the  list.  In  their  latest 
recommendations to the US government, they complain that:
81  Central Intelligence Agency. CIA fact book: Brazil. @: < 
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/br.html>
82  Associated Press. Brazil Denies Exporting AIDS Drugs To South Africa, January 30, 2002. @: 
<http://www.aegis.com/news/ap/2002/AP020132.html>
83  International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC). Interests that Kill: US Pressures Brazil to  
Abandon Successful AIDS Program. @: <http://www.iglhrc.org/site/iglhrc/>
84  Schmidt, A. A demographic profile of Brazil. Population Resource Center Report, September 1999. @: 
<http://www.prcdc.org/summaries/brazil/brazil.html> 
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The damage caused by the inadequate protection of intellectual property 
rights in India reaches beyond direct losses caused by displaced sales in 
India.  Indian bulk  pharmaceutical  companies aggressively export  their  
products to third countries where intellectual property laws are similarly  
lax. The damage caused to U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers due to the  
deficiencies of the Indian patent regime thus goes beyond displaced sales  
in the Indian market,  and reaches to the ability of  U.S.  companies to  
compete in other significant markets, especially in the Asia-Pacific and  
Middle East regions.85
The United States has already taken India to the WTO arbitration procedures in 1998, and 
they won when the WTO appellate body found that Indian pharmaceutical provisions 
described earlier contravened India’s responsibilities within the WTO.86
The second strategy is to place court cases in other countries to get some legislation 
repealed. The third and less obvious strategy is to mount a public relations campaign to 
gain public support to the above-mentioned policies, getting into a rhetorical game of 
blaming the victim. To them the problem is not that drugs are too expensive and cannot 
be afforded by the less developed countries, the problem is that those countries have too 
many internal problems and cannot provide for their own citizens adequately. As stated in 
one of the web sites run by the industry advocate PhRMA, “Criticisms of drug patents  
deflect  attention  from  the  real  barriers  to  health  care  —  poverty,  inadequate 
infrastructure, flawed health systems, cultural barriers and political corruption.”87  This 
shifts the blame of the problem on the affected countries themselves and the corruption 
they face. Corruption is indeed a real threat and must not be under-estimated. Responding 
to  public  outrages,  some pharmaceutical  companies  started  sending  drugs  to  African 
countries as humanitarian aid. A worrying recent report informs that a large shipment of 
anti-retroviral drugs produced by GlaxoSmithKline intended for the Ivory Coast, Senegal, 
Togo and the Republic of Congo were seized by corrupt officials and sent back to Europe 
to be resold. The culprits of this outrage appear to be officials in the receiving ports, and 
similarly  corrupt  Western  traders.88 It  is  extremely  worrying  that  such  negative 
experiences may hinder future efforts to provide assistance to AIDS ravaged nations.   
3.1 The case against Brazil
Because of the amount of political  power held by the pharmaceutical  industry in the 
United States, as examined earlier, there has been a marked effort by the representatives 
of the industry to request trade sanctions against several countries. 
The United States trade legislation that allows the legal imposition of trade sanctions 
against countries that do not protect intellectual property becomes particularly relevant in 
this case. As discussed above, every year the pharmaceutical industry watchdog in the 
United States writes a report about the countries that should be awarded with Special 301 
status, and lists others that should be watched. For the last four years, PhRMA has been 
85  PhRMA. Special Submission: Priority Foreign Country 2001, Op cit. 
86  Brown, E. "TRIPS: India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products Introduction”, 
European Journal of International Law, Vol.9, No. 1, 1998 p.182-184. 
87  PhRMA. Health Care in the Developing World: Intellectual Property and Access to AIDS Drugs. 2002. @: 
<http://world.phrma.org/ip.access.aids.drugs.html> 
88  Boseley, S and Carroll, R. “Profiteers resell Africa's cheap Aids drugs”, The Guardian, Friday October 4, 2002. @: 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/aids/story/0,7369,804387,00.html>
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complaining about Brazil, recommending that it should be included in the “Priority Watch 
List”.89 
For  the  year  2001,  PhRMA complained  about  two different  situations  in  Brazil  that 
affected  their  share  of  the  market.  The  main  complaint  concerned  the  regulations 
described in the previous section in regards to compulsory licences and the granting of 
powers to create generic versions of patented medicines. PhRMA claimed these powers 
contravene  regulations  in  the  TRIPS  agreement.  The  other  complaint  referred  to 
temporary  measures  implemented  by  the  Brazilian  government  in  1999.  Due  to  the 
serious economic crisis in Brazil, the government adopted a series of temporary measures 
that  have  frozen  drugs  prices  by  only  allowing  an  increase  of  4.4%  in  prices  in 
comparison with the previous year. This is way below devaluation and inflation rates.90 
The complaints against Brazil should come as no surprise, as the country has the largest 
potential  market  in  South  America,  for  the  pharmaceutical  industry.  Multinational 
corporations made a total of $7.2 billion USD in 1998, which dropped to $5.3 billion 
USD in 1999 and $5.5 billion USD in the year 2000, mostly due to the economic crisis in 
the country and the marked increase in the generic drugs market.91 The potential share of 
such a market by the pharmaceutical companies is such that the United States decided to 
stage a trade dispute in April 2000 at the WTO against the Brazilian patent regulations 
that allow parallel imports and compulsory licensing, requesting that the WTO set up a 
panel to investigate these issues.92
The arguments put forward in this case were simple. The United States pointed out that 
Article 68 (1)(i) allowed for compulsory licences to be established in the case where the 
patent had not been exploited in Brazil  three years after the patent was issued.  This, 
according to the United States, was in breach of Article 27.1 of the TRIPS agreement, 
which  states  that  “patents  shall  be  available  and  patent  rights  enjoyable  without  
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products  
are imported or locally produced.”93 The use of this article by the United States would 
appear  erroneous,  as  what  the  Brazilian  legislation  is  doing  is  not  to  create  a 
discrimination against the patent, but to establish certain limits if the patent is not properly 
worked locally. This is perfectly accepted by other patent agreements, such as the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. In particular, Art. 5(A)(4) clearly 
states that: 
A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to  
work or insufficient  working before the expiration of a  period of four 
years from the date of filing of the patent application or three years from 
the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall  
be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons.94
It  is  clear  that  by  reading  both  treaties,  the  Brazilian  legislation  does  not  violate 
international patent protection provisions, and the argument has no merit. 
89  PhRMA. Special Submission: Priority Foreign Country 2001. 20 February, 2001. @: 
<http://www.phrma.org/intnatl/news/2001-02-20.40.pdf>
90  Ibid.  
91  Ibid. 
92  Shanker, op cit; pp.53-55. 
93  TRIPS, Art. 27.1. 
94  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Art. 5(A)(4).
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The case produced considerable protest from NGOs and AIDS activists, as it was deemed 
that the action had been taken against the Brazilians to set them up as an example to other 
countries because they had been producing generic AIDS medicines.95 Despite this, it is 
important  to  note  that  the United States denies that  this  dispute  is  about the generic 
medicines, stating that it was only against the compulsory licensing and parallel import 
provisions  of  the  Brazilian  patent  legislation.  In  a  letter  by  an  American  trade 
representative to an AIDS advocate group, it  is stated that “this dispute is not about 
health or access to drugs.  It is about a measure that discriminates against imported  
products in favor of locally produced products, regardless of whether these products are  
health-related or not.”96 
The United States abandoned this dispute in June 2001.97 The reasons for this are unclear; 
it may be a combination of factors. Maybe this was a response to the international outrage 
and the accusations of bullying by an economic power to a country attempting to fight 
AIDS, and maybe even a realisation that the case was not strong to begin with. What is 
evident is that the action was initiated as the direct result of the pressure exerted by the 
pharmaceutical industry, and in particular by the influential writings of PhRMA. Indeed, 
Shanker  points  out  that  several  official  studies  from  the  American  government  are 
influenced by the drugs industry, stating that in those studies “practically every piece of  
information  pertaining  to  U.S.  pharmaceutical  companies  was  taken  from PhRMA’s 
publications.”98 
3.2 The case against South Africa
The case of South Africa has become one of the most publicised in recent years due to the 
HIV/AIDS  epidemic  in  Africa.  In  South  Africa  alone,  the  situation  is  dire;  from  a 
population of 40 million, it is believed that 4.5 million people have been infected. This 
translates to more than 10% of the total population, and almost 20% of those aged 15-49, 
being the country with the largest living infected inhabitants in the entire world.99 
This is a heavy toll for a developing country, more so when the high prices for retroviral 
medicines used to treat the symptoms are taken into consideration. South Africa is ranked 
111th place in the 2003 HDI, and although some of their statistics are not as worrying as 
many other Sub-Saharan African countries, health is certainly an issue. The per capita 
income for South Africa is $11,290 USD per year, with a life expectancy of 53.7 years 
and an under-five infant mortality rate of 71/1000 births. One of the main causes for these 
worrying figures  is  the AIDS epidemic.  With so many health problems,  it  is  doubly 
worrying to point out that the per capita health expenditure is $663 USD per year, with 
the public  percentage expenditure in  relation to  the Gross  Domestic  Product  of  only 
3.7%.100 
95  For an example of such anger, see: Oxfam. Drug Companies vs. Brazil: The Threat to Public Health. Oxfam GB 
Briefing Paper, May 2001. @: <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/brazilctc/ctcbraz.htm> 
96  Gonsalves, G. “Brazil/WTO case: USTR Response”, E-Drug e-mail Distribution list. Communication from Joseph 
Papovich, Assistant United States Trade Representative, posted by recipient, 21 February, 2001.  
97  USTR. United States and Brazil agree to use newly created Consultative Mechanism to promote cooperation on 
HIV/AIDS and address WTO patent dispute. Press release, June 25, 2001. @: 
<http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/06/01-46.pdf>
98  Shanker, op cit; p.95.  
99  Washington Post Online. Special report on AIDS in Africa. @: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/world/issues/aidsinafrica/>
100  United Nations Development Program. South African HDI indicators 2003. @: 
<http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/cty_f_ZAF.html>
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Faced with such an epidemic and lack of resources to deal with it properly, South Africa 
started to look for cheaper sources of supply for anti-retroviral pharmaceuticals to try to 
alleviate the problem. The 1978 Patent Act already allowed for compulsory licensing in 
the cases of abuse of the patent owner’s rights, not dissimilar to the provisions already in 
existence in other developing countries.101 However, the conditions for the granting of a 
compulsory licence were very narrow, such as in cases of disuse, abuse or the refusal to 
grant a patent. Nevertheless, it  is important to note that the Act allowed also for the 
granting of a compulsory licence if “the demand in the Republic for the patented article is  
being met by importation and the price charged by the patentee, his licensee or agent for  
the patented article is excessive in relation to the price charged therefore in countries  
where the patented article is manufactured by or under licence from the patentee or his  
predecessor or  successor in title.”102 This would seem to open the door  for  granting 
patents in case a product was being offered at a higher price in South Africa than in the 
country of origin, but it is still rather restrictive in the amount of cases in which such 
licences could be granted. Another problem present in the Patent Act was that it did not 
allow for compulsory licensing in cases of public interest, as is the case in other of the 
studied cases. 
As  the  existing  system  limited  the  options  that  could  be  taken,  the  South  African 
government attempted to address the crisis by passing a new regulation in 1997. This new 
legislation gave wider powers to the Department of Health to make exceptions to the 
existing patent law in cases of health emergencies facing the country, in the form of the 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act. Among the many provisions 
of  the new legislation,  the  most  important  appear  to  be those that  allow for  parallel 
imports of patented and generic pharmaceuticals into South Africa in an effort to ensure 
access by the public to more affordable medicines. The most controversial article of the 
Act states that:
The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable  
medicines  in  certain  circumstances  so  as  to  protect  the  health  of  the  
public, and in particular may-
(a)  notwithstanding  anything  to  the  contrary  […],  determine  that  the 
rights with regard to any medicine under a patent granted in the Republic  
shall not extend to acts in respect of such medicine which has been put  
onto the market by the owner of the medicine, or with his or her consent;
(b)  prescribe  the  conditions  on  which  any  medicine  […]  may  be 
imported.103
This opened the door for both parallel imports and generic imports of medicines, which 
was not possible with earlier legislation. With the legal framework in place, South Africa 
started importing small quantities of cheap anti-retroviral drugs from Brazil,104 but the 
country is still suffering from a serious lack of access to these drugs.     
Even  before  the  implementation  of  the  new  patent  provisions,  representatives  from 
pharmaceutical companies and the United States government made several comments to 
the South African government and the press warning them that the provisions included in 
101  Patents Act 1978, South Africa, Arts. 55 and 56. @: <http://www.gpa.co.za/english/za/pact.htm>
102  Patents Act 1978, South Africa, Art. 56 s.2(e). 
103  Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 1997, South Africa. @: 
<http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/1997/act90.pdf>
104  Associated Press. Brazil Denies Exporting AIDS Drugs To South Africa. Op cit. 
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the  new  legislation  went  against  international  treaties  on  patent  protection.105 These 
warning went unheeded and the Act was passed and signed by then president Nelson 
Mandela in November 1998, and was scheduled to enter into effect in April 1999.
Because of the implementation of the new Act, 42 pharmaceutical companies brought a 
case to the South African High Court on February 1999, requesting that the provisions 
regarding compulsory licensing, parallel imports and the special powers granted to health 
authorities  to  circumvent  patent  legislation  in  cases  of  public  interest,  should  be 
invalidated.106 
One of  the first  requests  of  the action was that  the  court  should issue an injunction 
stopping the new legislation from coming into effect. This was granted by the Court, 
leaving the provisions on stand-by until the court case was solved. The claimants also 
requested that the case should be referred to the Constitutional Court for analysis of the 
alleged unconstitutionality of several parts of the new law. Although claims were brought 
against several of the articles of the 1998 Act, the main target was Article 15c, which has 
been  described  already.  The  reasons  for  requesting  invalidation  on  the  grounds  of 
unconstitutionality were as follows: 
a) The article did not set any policy guidelines for the declaration of making drugs 
more accessible to the public. 
b) The proposed changes give the Minister of Health powers to restrict the scope 
of existing patent rights in South Africa. 
c)  The  article  allows  the  South  African  government  to  deprive  intellectual 
property right holders without specifying rules for compensation. 
d) The provisions in the article go against the Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement, 
which is a ratified treaty by the Republic of South Africa.
The  response  by  the  South  African  government  was  that  parallel  imports  were  not 
specifically forbidden by the TRIPS agreement, and that the provisions in the new Act 
were  not  unconstitutional.  The  defendants  conceded  the  point  regarding  compulsory 
licensing, arguing that the article in question would not be used for that purpose, but only 
for parallel import, arguably because the legal team representing the government thought 
that this concession would give them a better chance of winning the case.107
On September 8, 1999, the High Court remitted the case to the Constitutional Court as 
requested. Instead of entering into analysis of the validity of the unconstitutional claims 
made  by  the  pharmaceutical  companies,  the  Court  first  ruled  on  other  claims  of 
irregularities regarding the implementation of the Act (scheduled for April of that year). 
The Court was asked if such implementation would be legal under the Constitution, as the 
South African legislative body had not yet passed several procedural mechanisms that 
should accompany the Act.108 On these procedural requirements, the Court eventually 
ruled that the previous legislation on the control of medicines would stay in place until the 
105  Among these were letters from PhRMA representatives, the USTR and the American embassy in Pretoria. See: 
Consumer Project on Technology. Time-line of Disputes over Compulsory Licensing and Parallel Importation in  
South Africa. August 5, 1999. @: <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/sa-timeline.txt>  
106  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others. 1999 (4) SA 788 (T). @: <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharmasuit.html> 
107  Love, J. Report on court case over South Africa Medicines Act, March 5, 2001. @: 
<http://www.hivnet.ch:8000/topics/treatment-access/viewR?949>
108  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and another In re: the ex parte application of the President of the 
Republic of South Africa and others. Constitutional Court - CCT31/99, 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC); 2000 (3) BCLR 241 
(CC). 25 February 2000. @: <http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgments/2000/pharm.pdf>
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President determined a date for bringing the new Act into force.109 This was the first blow 
to the pharmaceutical companies. 
The Court held hearings between March 4 and 6, 2001, where both sides presented their 
cases,  and  several  affidavits  and  amici  curiae  were  also  read.  On  the  final  day  of 
proceedings, the claimants presented a request for recess, which the Court accepted. This 
was the last legal action the Court would hear from this case. 
From the start of the legal dispute, the case had been receiving a large amount of media 
attention. This publicity was not complimentary to the pharmaceutical companies; the 
lawsuit seemed like a straightforward case of corporate greed against a country crippled 
by the scourge of the AIDS epidemic. The common denominator in many of the articles 
seemed to be that the pharmaceutical companies were putting profits before human lives, 
an instant headline grabber.110 
At the same time,  NGOs, AIDS charities,  anti-globalisation activists  and many other 
pressure groups took the side of South Africa and started campaigning hard against the 
lawsuit.111 The pharmaceutical companies found themselves fighting a lonely war on the 
battlefield of public opinion, an engagement that they seemed doomed to lose. 
In the end the public pressure won. It is entirely possible that the industry considered that 
such bad press might be detrimental for future cases in which they would try to protect 
their intellectual property rights. It  could also be that an increase in bad press in the 
developed world, in particular in Europe and the United States, may have worried some 
companies about losing political influence, or even a backlash that could result in stricter 
price regulation, something they have thoroughly opposed in the past. 
The fact is that on April 19, 2001, the pharmaceutical companies abandoned their case 
and  settled  with  the  South  African  government.  The  terms  of  the  settlement  were 
described as beneficial to all parties by several observers, and were welcomed with almost 
universal approval around the world. In the end, the pharmaceutical industry could claim 
that  the  South  African  government  agreed  to  hold  talks  with  their  representatives 
regarding  the  future  implementation  of  the  new  Medicines  Act.  The  South  African 
government obtained assurances that the pharmaceutical companies would not pursue the 
matter and would be understanding of the South African AIDS situation. The statement 
says:
The government of the Republic of South Africa reiterates its commitment  
to honour its international obligations including the Agreement of Trade  
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In reliance of this  
commitment,  the referenced applicants recognize and reaffirm that  the  
Republic  of  South  Africa  may  enact  national  laws  or  regulations,  
including regulations implementing Act  90 of 1997 or adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health, and broaden access to medicines in  
accordance with the South African Constitution and TRIPS.112       
109  Ibid. 
110  For example, see: Mathiason, N. "South Africa fights Aids drug apartheid”, The Observer, January 14, 2001. @: 
<http://www.observer.co.uk/business/story/0,6903,421887,00.html>  
111  Pressure groups included support from groups like UNAIDS, MSF, Oxfam, Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Worldwide and many others. For an example of the support gathered by the movement, see: ACT UP, the Grey 
Panthers, the Health GAP Coalition, Oxfam America, and Doctors Without Borders. Solidarity with South Africa on 
the 1997 Medicines Act, March 12, 2001. @: <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/SAsolidarity.html> 
112  “Aids court battle: Joint statement”, BBC News, 19 April, 2001. @: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_1285000/1285645.stm>
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Although the drug companies claimed a partial victory, it seems obvious that the victory 
was really for the South African government, as there was a direct recognition that the 
articles in question could remain as they were. Because of that reason, this settlement has 
been welcomed and reported as a victory for the developing world against multinational 
corporations. 
3.3 TRIPS-plus
Since the year 2000, the United States has been pursuing another strategy with regards to 
international trade that has severe implications for the access to medicines debate.  The 
United  States  has  been  signing  bilateral  or  multilateral  agreements  with  developing 
countries in which the US agrees to provide trade benefits or assistance to a developing 
country; with the condition that they sign up to different sets of trade-related clauses that 
are designed to protect American interests in the signing country.113 Included in these 
agreements, there are several clauses relating to intellectual property rights that provide 
obligations that go beyond those enshrined in the TRIPS agreement. This has prompted 
some commentators to define these agreements as “TRIPS-plus”.114 
The content of the TRIPS-plus agreements vary, but of interest to the issue of access to 
medicines  are  those  provisions  regarding  patents.  TRIPS-plus  bilateral  agreements 
enhance the protection awarded by  TRIPS through two mechanisms,  particularly  the 
prescription of longer patent protection and the imposition of severe restriction to the 
grounds  for  granting  compulsory  licences.115 The  implementation  of  the  bilateral 
agreements has been boosted by the passing by the US Congress of the Bipartisan Trade 
Promotion Authority Act 2002, which makes it easier for the USTR to negotiate and 
conclude these agreements.116 A result  of  the  political  will  and commercial  lobbying 
pushing the TRIPS-plus agreements forward, there are a growing number of countries that 
have entered and concluded such negotiations.117 
An example of a bilateral TRIPS-plus agreement is the signing of the U.S.-Chile Free 
Trade Agreement, which contains a provision that practically destroys the existence of 
compulsory licensing in that South American country.118 Of particular interest is Art. 17.9. 
This article contains provisions that erode rights existing in TRIPS and other international 
agreements, including the following:  
- Patent terms can be extended to compensate for administrative delays.
113  Maskus, K. and Reichman, J. “The Globalisation Of Private Knowledge Goods And The Privatisation Of Global 
Public Goods”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.7, No. 2, 2004, p.279-320. 
114  Vaver, D. “Invention In Patent Law: A Review And A Modest Proposal”, International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology, Vol.11, No.3, 2003, pp.286-307.
115  Rivas Campo J.A. and  Juk Benke, R.T. “FTAA Negotiations: Short Overview”, Journal of International Economic 
Law, Vol.6, No. 3 2003, pp. 661-694.
116  Bagley, M. “Legal Movements in IP: TRIPS, Bilateral Agreements, and Access to Essential Medicines”, Emory 
International Law Review, Vol.17, 2003, p.781.
117  At the moment of writing, the United States had signed TRIPS-plus bilateral agreements with Jordan, Laos, Chile, 
Singapore and Israel. Several other countries are conducting bilateral negotiations with Bahrain, Morocco and 
Vietnam. Updated information can be found here: <http://www.tcc.mac.doc.gov> 
118  Office of the United States Trade Representative. Summary of the U.S.- Chile Free Trade Agreement, 2002. @: 
<http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/samerica/2002-12-11-chile_summary.pdf>
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- Chile can legislate exceptions to the normal rights granted by a patent, but these 
exceptions  “do  not  unreasonably  conflict  with  a  normal  exploitation  of  the  
patent”.119
- The  grounds  for  revoking  a  patent  are  limited  to  the  same grounds  required 
originally to refuse a patent, eliminating the ground of non-use.
- Chile can grant the use of the "subject matter" to a third party only for the purpose 
of  making  an  application  for  "marketing  approval  or  sanitary  permit  of  a  
pharmaceutical product."120 
All of the above constitute a de facto erosion of compulsory licensing, as it is difficult to 
see how a licence could be granted without contravening the above provisions. 
A more efficient strategy has been to negotiate multilateral  agreements with blocs of 
countries, as it allows for multilateral negotiations that will allow the United States to 
implement some of the enhanced patent protection to a larger number of countries.121 One 
of the most worrying cases of such multilateral agreements can be found with the Andean 
region  countries  (Colombia,  Ecuador,  Peru  and  Bolivia),  where  the  United  States 
suggested a series of measures that these countries had to undertake in order to be able to 
receive monetary assistance for the fight against drug traffickers and leftist guerrillas.122 
These countries entered into a trade agreement with the US named the Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA)123 in order to receive the funds and to be 
able to obtain preferential trade treatment. The agreement included a clause that would 
eliminate the practice of providing protection to generic drugs, ensuring that drugs would 
receive a minimum period of protection of five years before being marketed as generic. 
The US is also negotiated with numerous other developing countries in Latin America. 
Very tough rules on IPRs are being included in the draft text for the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA), where Section 5.5 of the Draft Chapter on IP Rights contains 
serious constraints to compulsory licensing.124
The largest and most controversial multilateral agreement signed to date is the Central 
American  Free  Trade  Agreement  (CAFTA)  in  early  2004.125 CAFTA  has  been 
surrounded  by  controversy  because  it  appears  to  be  a  precursor  of  the  tactics  and 
provisions that will be pushed in the FTAA. Intellectual property plays a large role in the 
negotiation  of  such  agreements,  and  from  the  beginning  of  the  negotiations, 
representatives  from  Central  American  developing  countries  were  warned  that  IPRs 
would be one of the most difficult negotiating points of the agreement, as it was at the top 
of the American agenda.126 CAFTA follows closely the wording of the U.S.-Chile Free 
Trade Agreement with regards to patents, and most of the provisions have been kept after 
119  United States/Chile Free Trade Agreement, Art. 17.9 para 3. 
120  Ibid. 
121  These include proposals to create multilateral agreements with the Middle East, and with the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU). 
122  Vélez Castaño, M. “Un vuelco en medicamentos” El Colombiano, September 20, 20002. @: 
<http://www.elcolombiano.terra.com.co> 
123  Office of the United States Trade Representative. First Report to the Congress on the Operation of the Andean Trade 
Preference Act, April 30, 2003. @: <http://www.ustr.gov/reports/2003atpa.pdf> 
124  MSF. US Trade Measures Threaten Access to Medicines in Latin America and the Caribbean, 31 October, 2002. @: 
<http://www.accessmed-msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=31102002954482&contenttype=PARA&>
125  The text of CAFTA can be found here: <http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/cafta.htm> 
126  Communication with Ms. Margarita Umaña, member of the CAFTA negotiation party for Costa Rica. 
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signing.  This  translates  to  an  enhancement  of  patent  protection  that  erodes  the 
circumstances in which compulsory licences can be granted. However, there are a couple 
of encouraging improvements that have been negotiated into the agreement, particularly 
from the initial refusal from Costa Rica to sign the agreement as it was and by walking 
out of the negotiations.127 One of the main changes from the text of the Chilean FTA is 
that CAFTA adds one paragraph to the reasons by which a patent could be struck down. 
The paragraph says that “fraud, misrepresentation, or inequitable conduct may be the  
basis for revoking, cancelling, or holding a patent unenforceable.”128 Of interest is the use 
of “inequitable conduct”. This could be used by courts to cancel patents in which the 
holder may refuse to commercialise the product in the country. 
What is going to be the effect of CAFTA to the issue of access to medicines? Even as 
early as the negotiating stages, commentators had expressed serious concerns about the 
effect  that  CAFTA would have  for  the  Costa  Rican  health  system. Professional  and 
industry  associations,  such  as  the  Medical  Association  and  pharmaceutical  industry 
representatives,  publicly  expressed  that  CAFTA  would  restrict  the  use  of  generic 
medicines.129 The  figures  seem  to  back  up  such  concerns.  In  2003  the  CCSS  had 
purchased  63  patented  medicines  at  a  cost  of  $23  million  USD,  while  373  generic 
medicines had cost $47 million USD.130 Representatives from Costa Rican health services 
expressed concern that any change in the current balance would have tremendous effects 
to the Costa Rican social health programmes. For example, if the CCSS has to purchase 
licences for the use of one widely used medicine such as enapril, this would mean an 
increase  in  $12  million  USD  per  year.131 Others  have  expressed  that  a  substantial 
reduction  in  the  number  of  generic  medicines  purchased  by  Costa  Rica  would  have 
nefarious effects to the amount of coverage from the public health system. At present, 
Costa Rica boasts that it can provide total coverage of the pharmaceutical needs of the 
poorest sectors of the population, but an increase in costs due to expenditure in patented 
medicines would mean that the CCSS could only cover 19% of the poorest inhabitants.132 
4. Doha and beyond
4.1 The Doha process    
During the 2001 WTO Doha Ministerial Meeting, the participants became aware that 
health and the access to medicines debate were of extreme importance for developing 
countries. This is the reason why the meeting produced a separate document regarding 
health, the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, a document that tries 
to enforce the importance of health to the international community. The Declaration starts 
by commenting that:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement  does not and should not  prevent 
members  from  taking  measures  to  protect  public  health.  Accordingly,  
while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that  
the  Agreement  can  and  should  be  interpreted  and  implemented  in  a  
127  Engler, M. “The Trouble with CAFTA”, The Nation, January 16,2004. @: 
<http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040202&s=engler>
128  CAFTA, Art. 15.9, para. 4. 
129  See for example: <http://www.encuentropopular.org/areas/tlc/artic013.htm>
130  López, G. “Peligra cobertura universal de medicamentos”, La Prensa Libre Online, February 10, 2004. @: 
<http://www.prensalibre.co.cr/2004/febrero/10/nacionales07.php>
131  Bermudez Mora, op cit. 
132  Avalós, “País defiende acceso a medicinas genéricas”, op cit. 
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manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in  
particular, to promote access to medicines for all.133
The Declaration went as far as to specify a number of flexibilities to be included within 
the TRIPS agreement with regards to least developed countries and public health issues. 
These flexibilities include:
a)  The  provisions  of  the  TRIPS  agreement  will  only  be  interpreted  in  light  of  the 
objectives and principles of the Agreement.
b) The member states will have the right to enact legislation that allows for the granting of 
compulsory licensing, and to regulate legislation in whatever form they see fit. 
c) The member states will have the right to determine what they consider a national 
emergency, taking into consideration that public health concerns can be considered such. 
d) Each member state will be able to determine particular situations for the exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights within their territory.134 
It is evident that these provisions validated most of the policies designed to guarantee the 
widest possible access to medicines described in the earlier sections with two poignant 
exceptions,  the issues of generic drugs and of parallel  imports.135 Paragraph 6 of the 
Declaration  states  that  “We  recognize  that  WTO  members  with  insufficient  or  no 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making  
effective  use  of  compulsory  licensing  under  the  TRIPS  Agreement.”  The  Council  of 
TRIPS was given the responsibility of drafting and implementing a workable set of rules 
to fix this problem and report back to the WTO General Council before the end of 2002. 
Despite  all  of  the  positive  indications  set  by  the  Declaration,  representatives  from 
developed countries successfully blocked the efforts to achieve an agreement within the 
Council of TRIPS, which had the approval of 144 countries.136  
Recent  developments  have  been  reached thanks  to  the  mounting  international  public 
pressure  to  resolve  this  impasse  –  fuelled  by  almost  universal  condemnation  of  the 
aggressive  tactics  used  by  the  United  States  during  the  post-Doha  process.  A  new 
agreement reached by the WTO on export of generic drugs was published in August 
2003, just before the Cancun Ministerial Meeting.137 This agreement finally managed to 
implement the Paragraph 6 in the Declaration to attempt to provide some ways in which 
developing countries without producing capabilities would be able to obtain cheap or 
generic medicines. 
Article  31(f)  of  TRIPS  imposes  restrictions  on  the  export  of  products  produced  by 
compulsory licensing outside the territory in which it is granted. This has generally been 
considered as a prohibition on the export of generic drugs that are produced within a local 
market, not allowing a developing country to import generics when they cannot produce 
133  WTO. Doha WTO Ministerial Conference: Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health.  Fourth WTO 
Ministerial Conference, Doha, Qatar. 9-14 November, 2001. @: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm> 
134  Ibid. 
135  Vandoren, P. “Médicaments sans Frontiéres? Clarification of the Relationship between TRIPS and Public Health 
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them.138 The  new  WTO  agreement  implemented  the  recommendation  in  the  Doha 
Declaration to allow for a temporary waiver for LDCs, allowing them to export generics 
under certain conditions. Another important provision is to continue to encourage the 
development of local pharmaceutical  industries by means of technology transfer. The 
Paragraph 6 agreement states that “Members undertake to cooperate in paying special  
attention  to  the  transfer  of  technology  and  capacity  building  in  the  pharmaceutical 
sector…”  
The system will operate in a two-pronged approach. Firstly, countries that are recognised 
as LDCs by the WTO will be able to use the paragraph 6 import system at any time and 
without needing to notify the TRIPS Council. Secondly, other developing countries may 
express their wish to import medicines to the TRIPS Council at any time, and they need to 
specify if they will use the system in whole or in a limited way.139 It should be understood 
that  if  this  agreement  provides  developing  countries  with  the  opportunity  to  import 
generic medicines that have been the subject of compulsory licences in other countries, it 
will also mean that this will be a tacit permission to manufacturing countries to export 
those medicines to the countries that have obtained this permission. 
These developments arising from the Declaration must be taken as an excellent sign that 
there  appears  to  be  a  renewed  understanding  of  the  importance  of  medicines  in  the 
international  trade  environment.  Nevertheless,  the  new  rules  have  been  met  with 
considerable scepticism from NGOs. MSF for example, has complained that “The United 
States and other Developed Economies now have greater opportunities to pressure and 
stop developing countries from issuing compulsory licenses.” 140
It is too early to ascertain if these fears are warranted, but the signing of this agreement 
must  be  welcomed  as  one  of  the  most  important  steps  towards  providing  access  to 
imported generics by least developed nations that cannot manufacture them, and it may 
open the door for more positive steps.  
4.2 The way forward     
It has become difficult to attempt to chart the trends in the access to medicines debate. 
There have been a number of considerable victories for developing countries already 
mentioned,  particularly  the Doha Health  Declaration,  the Paragraph 6  Cancun health 
commitments and the two defeats suffered by the pharmaceutical companies in Brazil and 
South Africa. It must also be pointed out that generally, the TRIPS agreement already 
includes some important provisions with respect to access to medicines that allow for 
some important flexibility awarded to developing nations. There also appears to be a 
growing understanding in the international arena that recognises that there should be a 
balance between health and intellectual property rights, and that health should always be 
given better treatment when balancing the many interests involved.  
On the other hand, there are some worrying trends taking shape. The Bush administration 
in  the  United  States  seems  adamant  in  pursuing  the  signing  and  implementation  of 
TRIPS-plus  agreements,  which  considerably  erode  some  of  the  existing  and  earned 
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flexibilities allowed to developing countries in the area of generic medicines. Another 
strategy is to continue using punitive trade policies to make developing countries comply 
with the interests of the pharmaceutical companies. The threat of Special 301 list is a 
powerful bargaining tool for changing the behaviour of developing countries. It would 
seem evident that the lure of a share in big markets, and the problems posed by the export 
of generic medicines will enhance the possibility of having more legal battles between the 
multinational drug companies and developing countries like India. The United States in 
particular seems very interested in continuing to push for more restrictive international 
patent system. It is their claim that pricing does not affect access and that by providing 
better patent protection the developing countries will benefit from increased international 
investment  and  better  trading  conditions.141 But  these  arguments  are  not  based  in 
empirical  data;  in  fact,  little  is  understood  about  the  relationship  between  pricing, 
investment and research. As stated by Abbott:
Regardless  of  whether  enhanced  patent  protection  for  pharmaceutical  
products may at some point in the future provide benefits to developing  
countries,  there  is  no  sound  empirical  basis  for  the  United  States  to  
demand  immediate  introduction  of  such  protection  by  developing 
countries, or to stand in the way of extending transition timetables for  
least-developed countries.142 
Regardless of these considerations, there is still a vested interest in continuing to ensure 
patent protection in developed countries. There cannot be any doubt that despite all of the 
problems that have been mentioned already about the amount of research investment by 
the pharmaceutical companies, they are still spending a considerable amount of money in 
that field. It would be dishonest to ask the members of an industry to relinquish all of their 
intellectual  property rights  in  order  to  provide access  to  medicines  worldwide,  but  a 
balance must be struck between excessively restrictive monopolies and exceptional issues 
of public health. 
The solutions to this problem then will not be simple. It is useless to propose the abolition 
of all pharmaceutical patents, or the immediate destruction of the TRIPS agreement. The 
solutions  lies  in  the  coming  together  of  several  areas,  such  as  international  trade, 
intellectual  property  rights,  international  assistance,  government  policy,  and  private 
assistance. 
The pharmaceutical industry must understand first that it is in their best interest to provide 
some  free  or  low-cost  medicines  to  the  poorest  areas  of  the  world.  Many  private 
initiatives are already underway to provide low-cost medicines to developing nations, 
such  as  PhRMA’s  Global  Partnerships  programmes,  which  give  approximately  $580 
million USD each year in assistance and medicines to developing countries.143 These 
initiatives  are  on  the  increase,  prompted  by  growing  public  pressure  and  investors 
clamouring for more ethical corporate policies.144 Developed nations are also providing 
direct assistance to developing countries, with the United States donating $2 billion USD 
globally in 2003 to the pharmaceutical industry.145 The Bush administration has taken a 
significant interest  to HIV in Africa,  donating $200 million USD in 2001, and $500 
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million USD in 2003 and 2003 to this problem alone.146 This investment has prompted the 
creation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,147 which consists of 
official government donations from developed nations, such as the funds from the United 
States,  and  considerable  contributions  from France  and the  UK.  Another  worthwhile 
effort is a joint project from the Clinton Foundation, the World Bank, UNICEF and the 
Global Fund to provide generic HIV medicines to developing nations.148 The Clinton 
Foundation has also achieved some price reduction agreements of anti-retroviral drugs 
with some major pharmaceutical companies.149 
Donations and direct assistance are needed, but there should also be a strong recognition 
that any solution must involve trade. There are already concerns about the problem of the 
misdirection of medicines sent to developing countries, and then sent back to developed 
nations to profit  from the immense price discrepancy. It  is  easy to see how generics 
exported to a poor country could make their way to a rich one. It is also easy to see how 
donated  medicines  could  be  misdirected  for  profit.  To  avoid  some  of  the  corrupt 
misdirection, the European Commission has adopted a set of regulations that attempt to 
stop the misdirection of drugs produced within the European Union from LDCs.150 This 
regulation establishes a “tiered priced product”, which are medicines manufactured in the 
EU that are sold in developing countries at a 25% of what they cost in OECD countries, 
and with only a 15% profit margin.151 These medicines must also have a mark (see Figure 
1).  There  is  already  a  plan  to  implement  similar  provisions  into  the  WTO’s  health 
system.152 These provisions could create a better environment in which pharmaceutical 
companies  and  developed  governments  will  be  more  willing  to  donate  and  export 
essential drugs to the neediest parts of the world. 
Figure 1
However, the long term goal must be the need to get developing countries to be able to 
produce, manufacture and research their own pharmaceuticals. Donations and assistance 
only serve to alleviate the problem, but as the cases studied above demonstrate that real 
improvements in health figures  can only be achieved through the creation of a  local 
pharmaceutical industry. This means that the problem of pharmaceuticals is a problem of 
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technology transfer; the issue will be once more the innovation and imitation dichotomy. 
Developing countries have to imitate technology that already exists in developed ones, 
and after a while there will be enough technological know-how to generate their own 
technology. This can already be seen in developing countries that have imitated health 
technology, such as the case in India.153 
All efforts then must go towards enhancing local production and research capabilities. 
Private efforts from the pharmaceutical companies in this respect should be welcome. 
Pharmaceutical  companies  should  understand  that  capacity  building  and  technology 
transfer can only work in their favour as a future strategy. If developing countries improve 
their health production standards, they will then become paying customers when they can 
afford medicines at better prices. As far as things stand, pharmaceutical companies are not 
profiting from poor countries, and there is no apparent immediate economic damage to 
them in promoting the transfer of health technology to the poorest regions of the globe. If 
things continue as they are, poor countries will remain under-developed, so the future 
revenue  in  sales  from those  countries  will  remain  low.  On  the  other  hand,  if  these 
countries  were  to  become developed,  a  potential  market  would  be  opened  for  these 
companies.  
There should also be more efforts from the governments of developing nations, such as 
the case of Thailand, where the government has put considerable investment in making 
sure that the local generic industry can now produce high-quality drugs to combat the 
HIV epidemic. In fact, “When the Thai Government Pharmaceutical Organization started  
producing  the  three-drug  pill  in  March  2002,  monthly  treatment  for  one  person  
plummeted to $30 from $500-$750.”154 However, not all governments have the capability 
to  fund  efforts  similar  to  those  of  the  Thai  government,  not  to  mention  the  local 
capabilities to embark on such an undertaking. 
But these solutions are only the start. Other solutions should be sought to encourage the 
transfer of technology in the health area. These solutions should be in par to those already 
described in this work, but there are other methods that can be used to enhance local 
production of medicines. 
Conclusion
The price of drugs, patents and the state of international trade law in the shape of the 
regulation of intellectual property rights are just a part of the bigger picture when dealing 
with the problem of access to medicines.
As it  was mentioned in  the last  section of  the article,  there are some serious  efforts 
underway in order to provide developing countries with beneficial access to medicines, 
and these efforts have to be applauded and continued. The good will of developed nations 
in this respect cannot be denied. 
But perhaps the debate will be brought forward by some recent happenings. The nightly 
news bulletins  in  developed countries  are  filled with stories  about  avian flu  and  the 
prospect of a pandemic that will kill millions of people. But it has also brought one issue 
back to the table, the access to medicines debate. There are reports that there is only one 
antiviral drug that deals with the current strain of the disease, a drug by Swiss company 
Roche called Tamiflu. There is growing concern that Roche is the only company with a 
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patent to produce this drug, and it is finally dawning on some people that this may not be 
such a good idea after all. This could highlight that while patents are generally beneficial, 
they can also prove dangerous in the time of an emergency. 
As things stand, the status quo is not affecting the pharmaceutical companies. Profits are 
still  flowing  like  never  before,  and  potential  advancements  in  biotechnology  could 
translate into more sales in the developed countries. Nevertheless, there cannot be any 
doubt  that  the  pharmaceutical  companies  can  only  benefit  from the  attempts  by  the 
developing countries to improve their living standards, as they will later become paying 
customers  when  they  can  afford  the  drugs.  And  one  of  the  ways  in  which  the  less 
developed  nations  can  improve  those  living  standards  is  through  access  to  basic 
medicines. As far as things stand, pharmaceutical companies are not receiving any sales 
revenue from poor countries, and there is no apparent immediate economic damage to 
them in allowing access to generic drugs by populations in need. If things continue as 
they are, poor countries will remain under-developed, so the future revenue in sales from 
those countries will remain low. On the other hand, if these countries were to become 
developed, a potential market would be opened for these companies. 
With this in mind, there may be more willingness from the part of the developed world to 
address this issue.   
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